

Drunk Driving: Beyond the Basics



Robert H. Humphrey, Esq.
Law Offices of Robert H.
Humphrey

As a result of extensive police officer training at the state and municipal level and the emphasis placed on the apprehension and prosecution of suspected drunk drivers, the successful defense of DUI cases needs to move beyond the basic case components.

In every drunk driving (DUI) case, the prosecution and defense are concerned with five basic components of the case:

1. Can the prosecution establish the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop the suspect's vehicle;
2. Can the prosecution prove the suspect's operation of the vehicle;
3. Can the prosecution demonstrate the necessary probable cause to arrest the suspect;
4. Can the prosecution prove the suspect was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs to a degree that rendered him/her incapable of safely operating the vehicle; and
5. Can the prosecution prove compliance with R.I. Gen. Laws 31-27-3 (the suspect's right to an independent physical examination by a physician of his/her own choosing)?¹

As a result of extensive police officer training at the state and municipal level and the emphasis placed on the apprehension and prosecution of suspected drunk drivers, the successful defense of DUI cases needs to move beyond the basic case components. This article focuses on recent Rhode Island Superior Court cases prosecutors and defense attorneys should consider when handling a DUI case.

I. PBT Refusal Precludes Subsequent Chemical Tests

In *State v. Cote*,² a suspected drunk driver was stopped by the Jamestown Police and refused the Officer's request that she submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT). However, at the Jamestown Police station, the suspect did submit to a breathalyzer test at the request of the Officer which resulted in readings of .127 and .125 blood alcohol content (BAC).

In granting the defendant's motion to suppress the breathalyzer test results, the Court, relying on *State v. DiStefano*,³ held the following: Even if a law enforcement officer is armed with a search warrant, the *DiStefano* holding mandates that no test shall be given to any suspect refusing a chemical test. Upon such refusal, the "plain and unambiguous" language, "none shall be given... becomes

operative" and precludes further testing. *DiStefano*, 764 A.2d at 1163. Thus, Defendant Cote's refusal extinguished the right of the officer to request and/or administer any further tests. The officer did have the right to cite the Defendant's refusal and subject her to the penalties of § 31-4.1-4, but the officer did not opt to do this.

Accordingly, Defendant Kathryn Cote's Motion to Suppress the breathalyzer results is granted.⁴

So, in accordance with the *Cote* decision, if a suspected drunk driver refuses to submit to a preliminary breath test on the side of the road the arresting Officer may not request the suspect to submit to a breathalyzer test at the station or the results of that breathalyzer test will be suppressed.

II. Lack of Release

In a DUI case, the prosecution has the burden of proving a suspected drunk driver was advised of his/her right to be examined at his/her own expense immediately after his/her arrest by a physician selected by the suspected drunk driver. This is why the Rights for Use at Scene card is read to the suspected drunk driver at the time of his/her arrest and why the Rights card is entered as a state's exhibit at trial.

Rhode Island General Law 31-27-3 states the following:

Right of person charged with operating under influence to physical examination.

A person arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of narcotic drugs or intoxicating liquor, whatever its alcoholic content, shall have the right to be examined at his or her own expense immediately after the person's arrest by a physician selected by the person, and the officer so arresting or so charging the person shall immediately inform the person of this right and afford the person a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right, and at the trial of the person the prosecution must prove that he or she was so informed and was afforded that opportunity.

Article I Section 9 of the Rhode Island

Florida

Legal Assistance Statewide

Edmund C. Sciarretta, Esq.
Suffolk Law 1970

PERSONAL INJURY
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
REAL ESTATE CLOSINGS • TITLE INSURANCE
PROBATE ADMINISTRATION
PROBATE LITIGATION
MARITAL & FAMILY LAW • GUARDIANSHIP
BANKRUPTCY • CRIMINAL LAW

Sciarretta & Mannino
Attorneys at Law

7301A West Palmetto Park Road • Suite 305C
Boca Raton, Florida 33433

1-800-749-9928 • 561/338-9900

Constitution, R.I. Gen. Laws 12-13-1 and Rule 46(a) of the Superior and District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure state that a Defendant shall be admitted to bail before conviction in most cases. To facilitate a Defendant's timely release on bail, R.I. Gen. Laws 12-10-2(a)(1) states in pertinent part "[t]he chief judge of the district court shall from time to time appoint,... as many justices of the peace as he or she may deem necessary, who shall be authorized to set and take bail in all complaintsailable before a division of the district court..."⁵

In *State v. Lemieux*,⁶ a suspected drunk driver was stopped and arrested by the Portsmouth Police at 11:47 p.m. At the station, the suspect indicated his desire to go home, but was informed by the Officer "that no call would be made to a justice of the peace unless and until \$200 cash was in '[the police department's] hands.'"⁷ The *Lemieux* Court held, "[i]t can not be gainsaid that the purpose of G.L. § 12-10-2(d) is to provide an arrestee with the opportunity to be released on bail when taken into custody during times when court is not in session. Clearly, this Defendant was not afforded his statutory and constitutional right to have an opportunity to secure his release."⁸ Furthermore, the Court held that "[a]bsent prompt and timely release, a Defendant's invocation of his right to a medical examination per G.L. § 31-27-3 is hollow 'because of the fleeting nature of the evidence that might be obtained as a result of the medical examination....' *Comm. v. King*, 429 Mass. 169, 176 (1999). The timeline of the events (and absence of events) in the instant case clearly establishes that the Defendant was deprived of his right under this statute as well."⁹ In granting the defendant's motion to suppress, the Court held that as a result of the violation of the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights the proper remedy is the suppression of the breathalyzer test results.¹⁰

Although not addressed in *Lemieux*, the lack of a timely release of a suspected drunk driver, who has submitted to the breathalyzer test, also triggers the defendant's rights pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 31-27-2(c)(6) which states:

[t]he person arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,... was afforded the opportunity to have an additional chemical test. The officer arresting or so charging the person shall have informed the person of this

**Your
One
Call**

PELLCORP INVESTIGATIVE GROUP, LLC

Private Investigations

Edward F. Pelletier III, CEO

(401) 965-9745

www.pellcorpinvestigativegroup.com

